ISO/IEC 27001

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Incident Response Playbook

1. Purpose

The Incident Response Playbook provides a practical, repeatable method for detecting, assessing, containing, investigating, recovering from, and learning from information security incidents.

It is designed to help the organization respond consistently while protecting:

  • Information
  • Customer data
  • Systems
  • Cloud environments
  • Applications
  • Identity and access
  • Business operations
  • Evidence
  • Regulatory and contractual obligations
  • Customer trust

The playbook is the master response process. Where a specific incident type is identified, the organization should transition to the appropriate specialized playbook.

Examples:

  • Phishing
  • Account Compromise
  • Cloud Compromise
  • Data Breach
  • Ransomware
  • Malware
  • Supplier Incident
  • Vulnerability Exploitation
  • Unauthorized Access
  • CI/CD or Source-Code Compromise
  • Production Availability Incident

2. Core Incident Response Lifecycle

The master lifecycle is:

Detect → Report → Validate → Classify → Escalate → Contain → Preserve Evidence → Investigate → Eradicate → Recover → Verify → Communicate → Learn → Improve → Close

The organization should not assume that every alert becomes an incident.

The initial assessment should determine whether the event is:

  • False positive
  • Routine security event
  • Security weakness
  • Suspected incident
  • Confirmed incident
  • Major/critical incident

3. When to Activate This Playbook

Activate formal incident response when there is credible evidence of:

  • Unauthorized access
  • Account compromise
  • Privilege escalation
  • Malware
  • Ransomware
  • Data exposure
  • Data loss
  • Unauthorized disclosure
  • Cloud compromise
  • Production compromise
  • Security-control manipulation
  • Significant vulnerability exploitation
  • Customer-impacting security event
  • Supplier security incident
  • Insider activity
  • Source-code or CI/CD compromise
  • Significant availability impact
  • Other events meeting the organization’s incident criteria

4. Incident Response Principles

4.1 Protect People and Business First

Where there is an immediate threat to people, critical operations, or safety, address that risk first.

4.2 Contain Before the Situation Gets Worse

Do not allow an active attacker or malicious activity to continue unnecessarily.

4.3 Preserve Evidence

Containment should be performed in a way that preserves important evidence where reasonably possible.

4.4 Facts Before Assumptions

Separate:

  • Confirmed facts
  • Observations
  • Assumptions
  • Hypotheses
  • Unknowns
  • Conclusions

4.5 Least Privilege

Only authorized responders should receive access to incident information and evidence.

4.6 Need-to-Know Communication

Do not unnecessarily disclose:

  • Customer information
  • Personal information
  • Credentials
  • Security architecture
  • Vulnerability details
  • Investigation evidence
  • Internal response information

4.7 Reassess Continuously

Severity, scope, impact, and response requirements can change as evidence becomes available.


5. Incident Response Team

The response team may include:

RolePrimary Responsibility
Incident CommanderOverall incident coordination
Security LeadSecurity assessment and response
Incident InvestigatorEvidence and technical investigation
IT / Cloud LeadInfrastructure containment and recovery
Application / DevOps LeadApplication and CI/CD investigation
Privacy / Data ProtectionPersonal-data impact assessment
Legal / ComplianceLegal, regulatory, contractual assessment
Business OwnerBusiness-impact decisions
Customer Success / CommunicationsCustomer communication
HREmployee-related incidents
Supplier OwnerThird-party coordination
Executive ManagementMajor incident decisions
BCP / DR LeadBusiness continuity and recovery

In a startup, one person may perform multiple roles, but decision conflicts and independence requirements should be considered.


6. Incident Record

Create an incident record as soon as formal incident response is activated.

Minimum Information

Incident ID:

INC-YYYY-0001

Date/Time Detected:

Reported By:

Incident Owner:

Incident Commander:

Incident Type:

Initial Severity:

Affected Systems:

Affected Information:

Customer Impact:

Current Status:

Initial Description:


7. Step 1 — Detect

Identify the signal or event that triggered investigation.

Possible sources:

  • Employee report
  • Customer report
  • Supplier report
  • Security monitoring
  • SIEM
  • EDR
  • Cloud security service
  • Vulnerability scanner
  • Application monitoring
  • Identity monitoring
  • Network monitoring
  • Email security
  • Audit
  • Security testing
  • Threat intelligence
  • Automated alert

Record:

  • What was detected
  • When it was detected
  • Who detected it
  • System involved
  • Initial evidence
  • Initial impact indicators

8. Step 2 — Report

The event should be reported through the organization’s approved reporting mechanism.

Capture:

  • Reporter
  • Date/time
  • Description
  • Affected system
  • User/account
  • Suspicious activity
  • Available evidence
  • Initial impact
  • Immediate actions taken

Employees should:

  • Report quickly
  • Preserve evidence
  • Avoid deleting suspicious messages/files
  • Avoid conducting unauthorized investigation
  • Avoid communicating externally
  • Never include passwords or secrets in the incident report

9. Step 3 — Validate

Determine whether the reported activity is genuine.

Review:

  • Authentication records
  • Identity activity
  • System logs
  • Cloud logs
  • Application logs
  • Security alerts
  • Network activity
  • Configuration changes
  • User activity
  • Approved changes
  • Maintenance activity
  • Known business activity

Decision

Is the event genuine?

If No

Record the evidence and close or monitor as appropriate.

If Yes

Continue assessment.


10. Step 4 — Classify

Determine the event classification.

Typical classification:

ClassificationMeaning
CE-0False Positive
CE-1Routine Security Event
CE-2Security Weakness
CE-3Suspected Incident
CE-4Confirmed Incident
CE-5Major/Critical Incident

Classification should be based on evidence and organizational incident criteria.


11. Step 5 — Assess Severity

Assess:

Confidentiality

Was information accessed, disclosed, copied, or exposed?

Integrity

Was information, configuration, code, or system behavior changed?

Availability

Was a system or service unavailable or degraded?

Business Impact

Consider:

  • Revenue
  • Critical operations
  • Customer service
  • Production
  • Contracts
  • Reputation
  • Business continuity

Information Impact

Consider:

  • Customer information
  • Personal information
  • Financial information
  • Health information
  • Credentials
  • Intellectual property
  • Source code
  • Confidential information
  • Regulated information

Scope

Determine whether the incident is:

  • Isolated
  • Limited
  • Broad
  • Widespread
  • Unknown

12. Step 6 — Escalate

Escalate according to the organization’s severity and escalation criteria.

Immediate escalation should be considered when there is:

  • Privileged account compromise
  • Cloud administrator compromise
  • Active attacker
  • Ransomware
  • Significant data exposure
  • Customer impact
  • Personal or regulated information exposure
  • Significant exfiltration
  • Production compromise
  • Major outage
  • Critical vulnerability exploitation
  • Security logging disabled or manipulated
  • Major supplier compromise
  • Financial fraud or BEC
  • Regulatory or contractual implications

Escalation should involve the appropriate technical, business, legal, privacy, and management stakeholders.


13. Step 7 — Contain

The objective is to stop or limit the incident.

Possible actions:

  • Disable compromised accounts
  • Revoke active sessions
  • Revoke tokens
  • Rotate credentials
  • Rotate API keys
  • Remove unauthorized access
  • Restrict network access
  • Isolate affected endpoints
  • Isolate workloads
  • Block malicious domains/IPs
  • Disable compromised integrations
  • Restrict cloud permissions
  • Disable unauthorized IAM roles
  • Isolate affected applications
  • Protect backups
  • Stop malicious processes where appropriate

Containment should be documented.

Containment Record

Action:

Performed By:

Date/Time:

Reason:

Expected Impact:

Actual Impact:


14. Step 8 — Preserve Evidence

Identify and preserve relevant evidence before it is lost or overwritten, where practical.

Potential evidence includes:

  • Authentication logs
  • IAM activity
  • CloudTrail
  • CloudWatch
  • GuardDuty
  • Security Hub
  • EDR data
  • Firewall logs
  • WAF logs
  • DNS logs
  • Network logs
  • Application logs
  • Database logs
  • Email headers
  • Phishing messages
  • Endpoint artifacts
  • Configuration changes
  • Source-code changes
  • CI/CD logs
  • Access records
  • Backup records
  • Security alerts
  • Screenshots
  • Communications

Record:

Evidence ID → Source → Collector → Date/Time → Method → Location → Hash/Integrity Evidence → Storage → Access

Never store credentials or secrets as investigation evidence unless specifically authorized and securely handled.


15. Step 9 — Investigate

Establish what actually happened.

The investigation should determine:

  1. What happened?
  2. When did it happen?
  3. How did it happen?
  4. Who or what initiated the activity?
  5. Which identity was involved?
  6. Which systems were accessed?
  7. What permissions were used?
  8. Was privilege escalated?
  9. Was persistence established?
  10. Was lateral movement performed?
  11. What information was accessed?
  12. Was information copied or exfiltrated?
  13. What systems were changed?
  14. What was the initial attack vector?
  15. Is the attacker still active?
  16. What was the root cause?
  17. What controls failed or were bypassed?

16. Identity Investigation

Review:

  • User accounts
  • Administrator accounts
  • Service accounts
  • IAM users
  • IAM roles
  • SSO identities
  • API keys
  • Access tokens
  • OAuth applications
  • MFA activity
  • Authentication locations
  • Authentication times
  • Privilege changes
  • Group membership
  • Role assumptions

Look for:

  • Unusual login
  • Impossible travel
  • New device
  • New MFA method
  • Password change
  • Token creation
  • New API key
  • New privileged role
  • Unexpected privilege escalation

17. System Investigation

Determine which systems were affected.

Review:

  • Endpoints
  • Servers
  • Cloud workloads
  • Containers
  • Kubernetes
  • Databases
  • Storage
  • Applications
  • Networks
  • APIs
  • CI/CD
  • Source repositories
  • SaaS platforms
  • Backup systems

Document:

System → Activity → Evidence → Impact → Status


18. Cloud / AWS Investigation

For AWS environments, investigate as applicable:

  • AWS IAM
  • CloudTrail
  • CloudWatch
  • GuardDuty
  • Security Hub
  • S3
  • RDS
  • ECS
  • EKS
  • EC2
  • Lambda
  • VPC
  • Security Groups
  • WAF
  • KMS
  • Secrets Manager
  • Systems Manager
  • Backup
  • CI/CD services

Review:

  • Authentication
  • Role assumption
  • Permission changes
  • Resource creation
  • Security-group changes
  • Public exposure
  • S3 access
  • Database access
  • Secret access
  • Key usage
  • Logging changes
  • Data downloads
  • Network activity

19. Data Impact Assessment

Determine whether information was:

  • Accessed
  • Viewed
  • Modified
  • Deleted
  • Copied
  • Downloaded
  • Exfiltrated
  • Disclosed
  • Lost
  • Unavailable

Classify affected information.

Examples:

  • Customer information
  • Personal information
  • Financial information
  • Authentication information
  • Confidential business information
  • Intellectual property
  • Source code
  • Security credentials
  • Regulated information

Determine:

  • What information?
  • Whose information?
  • How much?
  • Which systems?
  • Which timeframe?
  • Which individuals/customers?
  • Was it actually accessed or only potentially accessible?
  • Is notification assessment required?

20. Lateral Movement Assessment

Determine whether the attacker moved from the initial system to other systems.

Review:

  • Authentication activity
  • Remote access
  • Privilege escalation
  • Network connections
  • Service accounts
  • Cloud role assumptions
  • Administrative activity
  • Endpoint activity
  • Application access
  • Database access

Document:

Initial System → Identity → Privilege → System 2 → System 3 → Data/System Impact


21. Persistence Assessment

Determine whether unauthorized access may remain.

Look for:

  • New accounts
  • New IAM roles
  • New access keys
  • Scheduled tasks
  • Services
  • Startup mechanisms
  • OAuth applications
  • Tokens
  • SSH keys
  • Backdoors
  • Modified CI/CD pipelines
  • Web shells
  • Unauthorized cloud resources

Do not close the incident until reasonable persistence checks have been completed.


22. Step 10 — Eradicate

Remove the cause and attacker access.

Actions may include:

  • Remove malicious accounts
  • Remove unauthorized IAM roles
  • Remove unauthorized permissions
  • Revoke sessions
  • Rotate credentials
  • Rotate secrets
  • Revoke tokens
  • Remove persistence
  • Remove malware
  • Patch exploited vulnerabilities
  • Correct insecure configurations
  • Remove unauthorized resources
  • Rebuild compromised systems
  • Secure CI/CD
  • Update detection rules

23. Step 11 — Recover

Restore affected systems to a trusted state.

Recovery sequence may include:

Identity → Security Controls → Network → Infrastructure → Database/Storage → Application → Integrations → Monitoring → Business Service

Validate:

  • Security configuration
  • Access controls
  • MFA
  • Logging
  • Monitoring
  • Encryption
  • Backups
  • Vulnerability status
  • Application integrity
  • Data integrity
  • Service functionality

24. Step 12 — Verify Recovery

Do not treat restoration as successful merely because the system is running.

Verify:

  • Threat removed
  • Unauthorized access removed
  • Credentials secured
  • Persistence removed
  • Security controls restored
  • Logging functioning
  • Monitoring functioning
  • Data integrity verified
  • Vulnerabilities addressed
  • Application functioning
  • Business service functioning
  • Increased monitoring implemented where necessary

25. Step 13 — Communication

Communications should be:

  • Timely
  • Accurate
  • Authorized
  • Fact-based
  • Need-to-know
  • Consistent
  • Appropriate to the audience

Potential stakeholders:

  • Incident Response Team
  • Management
  • Business owners
  • Employees
  • Customers
  • Suppliers
  • Legal
  • Privacy
  • Regulators
  • Cloud providers
  • Cyber insurers
  • Law enforcement

Do not speculate about:

  • Root cause before evidence supports it
  • Attacker identity
  • Number of affected customers before confirmed
  • Data exposure before investigation
  • Regulatory conclusions before appropriate assessment

26. Customer Communication

Where customer communication is required:

  1. Confirm facts.
  2. Identify affected services.
  3. Determine known impact.
  4. Coordinate with Legal/Privacy where appropriate.
  5. Obtain required approval.
  6. Communicate only verified information.
  7. Explain actions taken.
  8. Provide appropriate next steps.
  9. Maintain communication records.

27. Regulatory and Contractual Assessment

Determine whether the incident creates:

  • Regulatory notification requirements
  • Customer notification requirements
  • Contractual notification requirements
  • Insurance notification requirements
  • Supplier notification requirements
  • Legal obligations

Record:

Requirement → Applicability → Decision → Approver → Action → Date → Evidence

The organization should obtain appropriate legal/privacy advice where required.


28. Step 14 — Root Cause Analysis

After containment and stabilization, determine why the incident occurred.

Consider:

Technology

  • Vulnerability
  • Misconfiguration
  • Missing security control
  • Insecure architecture

People

  • Lack of awareness
  • Training gap
  • Human error
  • Role ambiguity

Process

  • Missing procedure
  • Inconsistent execution
  • Weak review
  • Poor escalation

Governance

  • Unclear ownership
  • Inadequate risk treatment
  • Missing management oversight
  • Poor control design

Supplier

  • Third-party failure
  • Subprocessor issue
  • Supplier control weakness

The root cause should be supported by evidence.


29. Step 15 — Corrective Actions

Create corrective actions for identified weaknesses.

Examples:

  • Improve MFA
  • Reduce privileges
  • Improve monitoring
  • Patch vulnerability
  • Update procedures
  • Improve supplier controls
  • Improve backup protection
  • Improve security awareness
  • Automate detection
  • Improve incident escalation
  • Improve logging
  • Improve cloud configuration
  • Update security architecture

Link each action to:

Finding → Root Cause → Action → Owner → Deadline → Evidence → Verification → Risk


30. Step 16 — Risk Reassessment

After remediation, reassess the relevant risk.

Determine:

  • Original risk
  • Controls implemented
  • Remaining weakness
  • Residual risk
  • Risk owner
  • Risk acceptance, if applicable

Do not assume that completing a corrective action automatically eliminates the risk.


31. Step 17 — Post-Incident Review

Conduct a post-incident review for significant incidents and where organizational criteria require it.

Review:

  • What happened?
  • What worked?
  • What failed?
  • Was detection timely?
  • Was escalation timely?
  • Was containment effective?
  • Was evidence preserved?
  • Was communication effective?
  • Was recovery successful?
  • Were customers affected?
  • Were controls effective?
  • What should change?

Record lessons in the Lessons Learned Register.


32. Step 18 — Continual Improvement

Convert important lessons into improvements.

Possible outputs:

  • Policy changes
  • Procedure changes
  • Technical controls
  • Monitoring improvements
  • Training
  • Automation
  • Architecture changes
  • Supplier changes
  • Risk treatment
  • Security objectives
  • Incident playbook updates

The improvement should be tracked until effectiveness is verified.


33. Incident Closure Criteria

An incident should not be closed simply because the immediate threat has stopped.

Confirm:

  • Incident scope established as far as reasonably possible
  • Containment completed
  • Evidence preserved
  • Investigation completed
  • Attacker access removed
  • Persistence assessed
  • Credentials secured
  • Systems recovered
  • Recovery verified
  • Data impact assessed
  • Customer impact assessed
  • Notification requirements assessed
  • Root cause identified where reasonably possible
  • Corrective actions assigned
  • Residual risk assessed
  • Lessons learned recorded
  • Required communications completed
  • Management review completed where required
  • Closure approved

34. Incident Closure Record

Incident ID:

Final Classification:

Final Severity:

Summary:

Root Cause:

Impact:

Data Impact:

Customer Impact:

Actions Completed:

Open Corrective Actions:

Residual Risk:

Lessons Learned:

Management Decision:

Closed By:

Closure Date:


35. Specialized Playbook Selection

After classification, select the appropriate specialized playbook.

IncidentSpecialized Playbook
PhishingPhishing Response Playbook
Account CompromiseAccount Compromise Playbook
Cloud CompromiseCloud Compromise Playbook
Data BreachData Breach Playbook
RansomwareRansomware Response Playbook
MalwareMalware Response Playbook
Supplier IncidentSupply Chain Incident Playbook
Vulnerability ExploitationVulnerability Exploitation Playbook
CI/CD CompromiseCI/CD Security Incident Playbook
Production Security IncidentProduction Incident Playbook

If multiple incident types are involved, the Incident Commander may activate multiple playbooks.

Example:

Phishing → Credential Compromise → AWS Account Compromise → Data Breach


36. Startup-Friendly Incident Response Model

A startup can operate a practical incident response process with:

1. One Incident Register

Central record of incidents.

2. One Incident Commander

Clear decision authority.

3. One Evidence Repository

Controlled location for investigation evidence.

4. One Severity Matrix

Consistent classification.

5. One Escalation Matrix

Clear escalation rules.

6. Specialized Playbooks

Use only when applicable.

7. One Corrective Action Tracker

Central tracking of improvements.

8. Regular Tabletop Exercises

Test the process before a real incident.


37. Minimum Incident Response Toolkit

A practical ISMS should maintain access to:

  • Incident Reporting Form
  • Incident Register
  • Event Register
  • Event-to-Incident Decision Checklist
  • Incident Severity Matrix
  • Incident Escalation Matrix
  • Incident Response Team RACI
  • Evidence Preservation Procedure
  • Incident Timeline
  • Incident Investigation Template
  • Root Cause Analysis Template
  • Corrective Action Tracker
  • Lessons Learned Register
  • Post-Incident Review
  • Incident Closure Report
  • Communication Procedure
  • Specialized Incident Playbooks
  • Incident Metrics
  • Tabletop Exercise Template

38. Incident Response Testing

The organization should periodically test its incident response capability.

Testing can include:

  • Tabletop exercises
  • Phishing simulations
  • Account-compromise scenarios
  • Cloud-compromise scenarios
  • Ransomware scenarios
  • Data-breach scenarios
  • Supplier incidents
  • Recovery exercises

Record:

Scenario → Participants → Decisions → Observations → Gaps → Corrective Actions → Improvements → Retest


39. Incident Response Metrics

Useful metrics include:

Time to Detect

Incident occurrence → Detection

Time to Report

Detection → Formal report

Time to Validate

Report → Validation

Time to Escalate

Validation → Required escalation

Time to Contain

Incident activation → Containment

Time to Recover

Containment → Verified recovery

Recurrence Rate

Similar incidents occurring again after remediation

Metrics should be analyzed in context rather than used as isolated performance targets.


40. Audit Evidence

Maintain appropriate evidence of:

  • Incident reports
  • Incident records
  • Event assessments
  • Severity decisions
  • Escalation records
  • Evidence collection
  • Investigation timelines
  • Containment actions
  • Recovery validation
  • Communication records
  • Notification assessments
  • Root Cause Analysis
  • Corrective actions
  • Lessons learned
  • Risk reassessment
  • Management review
  • Tabletop exercises
  • Effectiveness verification

41. ISO 27001 Alignment

The incident response process supports the organization’s information-security incident management arrangements, including:

  • Reporting of information-security events
  • Assessment and decision-making
  • Response activities
  • Evidence preservation
  • Learning from incidents
  • Corrective action
  • Continual improvement
  • Communication
  • Risk management

The exact playbook structure, severity levels, forms, registers, roles, and workflows are organizational implementation choices. They should be tailored to the organization’s context, risk, size, technology, contractual requirements, and applicable legal/regulatory obligations.


42. Master Incident Response Audit Trail

Security Event Detected → Event Reported → Incident Validated → Classification Determined → Severity Assessed → Incident Escalated → Response Team Activated → Evidence Preserved → Containment Completed → Investigation Conducted → Scope Determined → Data/Business Impact Assessed → Root Cause Identified → Threat Eradicated → Systems Recovered → Recovery Verified → Communications Completed → Notification Requirements Assessed → Corrective Actions Assigned → Risk Reassessed → Lessons Learned → ISMS Improvement Identified → Management Review → Incident Closed


Final Principle

Detect Quickly + Validate Carefully + Contain Effectively + Preserve Evidence + Investigate the Facts + Protect Information + Recover From a Trusted State + Verify Recovery + Learn From the Incident + Improve the ISMS.

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